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In the first era of financial globalization (1880-1914), global capital market integration led to 
substantial net capital movements from rich to poor economies. The historical experience 
stands in contrast to the contemporary globalization where gross capital mobility is equally 
high, but did not incite a substantial transfer of savings from rich to poor economies. Using 
data for the historical and modern periods we extend Lucas’ (1990) original model and show 
that differences in institutional quality between rich and poor countries can account for the 
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1. Introduction  
During the first era of financial globalization between 1880 and 1914 international capital 
mobility was as high as today. The Feldstein-Horioka (1980) test even suggests that capital 
movements were higher in the historical era (Bayoumi, 1990; Eichengreen, 1990; Taylor, 
1996; Jones and Obstfeld, 1997). Yet the patterns of international capital flows differ 
markedly between the two periods of largely unrestricted capital mobility. Before WW1 
capital flows were predominantly one-directional in the sense that capital flowed from the rich 
core economies in Europe to the poorer periphery on a net basis. As a consequence, the rich 
creditor nations in the core had built up substantial net foreign asset positions of around 20 
percent of their aggregate GDP, and by 1914 foreign capital to output ratios averaged more 
than 100 percent in developing countries (Edelstein, 1982; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; 
Schularick, 2006). In the contemporary globalization, gross capital mobility is equally high, 
but does not lead to substantial net capital flows between rich and poor economies. As a 
result, the Lucas (1990) paradox of missing rich-poor capital flows is more pronounced than 
in the first globalization.1 In their important study, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, p. 55) 
concluded that the contemporary financial globalization was characterized by “diversification 
finance” as opposed to “development finance” before WW1: 
Today’s foreign asset distribution is much more about asset “swapping” by rich  countries – 
diversification – than it is about the accumulation of large one-way positions—a critical 
component of the development process in poorer countries in standard textbook treatments.  
 How can we account for these differences between now and then? Why was capital 
market integration before 1914 marked by massive net capital flows to poor economies while 
the contemporary globalization is characterized by diversification finance and limited net 
capital movements? In this paper, we aim to sketch a potential theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon along the lines of Lucas’ thinking about determinants of rate of return 
differentials between developed and less developed economies. In his seminal paper, Lucas 
(1990) argued that differences in the relative human capital endowments could be an 
                                                 
1 While Clemens and Williamson (2004) found that the wealth bias of financial investment was as 
strong before 1914, other studies have questioned the robustness of this result after controlling for 
outliers and pointed to a much less pronounced “wealth bias” in international capital flows before 
WW1 (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Schularick, 2006). This also mirrors the earlier findings by 





explanation for the absence of substantial net capital movements from rich and poor countries 
during the post-WW2 period. In Lucas’ original line of thought, physical capital is 
comparably unproductive in poor countries because complementary factors such as human 
capital are missing. This perspective can be referred to as the “unproductive capital view”. 
The alternative position, the “capital market failure view”, stresses factors such as asymmetric 
information, distorting policies, and unenforceable property rights. This strand of the 
literature highlights the quality of institutions – such as the protection of creditors and the 
enforcement of property rights across international borders – as a necessary condition for net 
investment flows and the buildup of sizeable net foreign asset positions (Shleifer, 2003).  
Recent empirical studies have pointed to the important contribution legal and political 
arrangements made to development finance before 1913 by increasing creditor protection and 
borrowers willingness to pay (Ferguson, 2003; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005a; Ferguson 
and Schularick, 2006). Weak institutions have also been made responsible for the paucity of 
rich-poor capital flows in the contemporary globalization. The cross-country study by Alfaro 
et al. (2003) concluded that weak institutional quality was the most important variable for 
explaining the paucity of rich-poor capital flows between 1971 and 1998. More recently Ju 
and Wei (2006) have shown how the quality of property rights can be a cause for the observed 
paradoxes in global capital flows.  
The “unproductive capital view” and the “capital market failure view” are by no 
means mutually exclusive. We therefore ask whether a combination of these two approaches 
is capable of explaining the different patterns of international capital flows during the two 
eras of financial globalization within a unified framework. In a first step, we extend Lucas’ 
(1990) original model to account for the impact of institutional quality on rate of return 
differentials between rich and poor countries. In a second step, we evaluate the model using 
modern and historical data to see what difference in the quality of institutions between rich 
and poor countries could explain the observed patterns of capital flows. Finally, we check the 
plausibility of these results against the available evidence on differentials in institutional 
quality between rich and poor countries in both eras of financial globalization.  
This exercise shows that it is possible to explain why rich-poor capital movements are 
negligible in modern times but were substantial before WW1: we find a considerably higher 







2. An extended Lucas exercise  
We start by extending the original Lucas (1990) framework to incorporate the effects of 
differences in institutional quality on rate of return differentials between rich and poor 
countries. Lucas himself proposed that institutional factors could play an important role for 
the paucity of capital flows from rich to poor (1990, pp. 94/95): 
Until around 1945, much of the Third World was subject to European-imposed legal and 
economic arrangements, and had been so for decades or even centuries. A European lending 
to a borrower in India or the Dutch East Indies could expect his contract to be enforced with 
exactly the same effectiveness and by exactly the same means as a contract with domestic 
borrowers.  
Assume, following Lucas (1990), that the production technology is 
( )1Y A hL K hα α γ−= , where Y  is final output, 0,0 1, 0A α γ> < < >  denote constant 
technology parameters, h  is human capital per capita, L  (unskilled) labor, K  represents the 
stock of physical capital, and hγ  captures a production externality. Output per effective labor, 
: /( )y Y hL= , is given by y Ak hα γ= , where : /( )k K hL= . The competitive and private rate of 
return on capital may then be expressed as 1r Ak hα γμα −= , where 0 1μ≤ ≤  captures the 
degree of property rights protection. By solving y Ak hα γ=  for k  and plugging the result 
into the previous expression for the rate of return, we get 1/ ( 1) / /r A y hα α α γ αμα −= . Hence, the 
ratio of the rate of returns on capital in poor and rich countries may be expressed as follows: 
 
( 1) /( 1) / / //
/
p p p p p p p pr
r r r r r r r p r
r y h Y L hh
r y h Y L h h
α αα α γ α γ αμ μ
μ μ
−− ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, (1) 
 
where the subindex p  stands for “poor” and r  for “rich”. Equation (1) shows that the rate of 
return differential, /p rr r , depends on the relative protection of property rights, /p rμ μ , on 
relative output per capita, ( / ) /( / )p p r rY L Y L , and on the relative stocks of human capital per 
capita, /p rh h .  
To evaluate the model we need information on the terms appearing on the right hand 
side. The baseline set of parameters is discussed in the next section. The human capital 





Peri (2006) have shown in the meantime that the standard estimates are heavily upward 
biased. Benhabib and Perli (1996) even use 0.1γ = . Since this parameter is hard to specify 
with certainty, we decided to let [0.15,0.2]γ ∈ . 
 
3. Data sources and parameter specification: now and then 
With regard to the underlying data, we make a few adjustments to Lucas’ original numerical 
exercise. First, unlike Lucas we don’t look at just two countries, the US and India, but use a 
broader sample of developed and developing countries. For the historical and the modern 
period our dataset covers 54 respectively 24 economies. Second, for both periods, we split the 
sample into a rich and a poor half by classifying all countries as poor if their GDP per capita 
is less than the sample mean. Finally, we average the relevant data across the “rich” and 
“poor” parts of the world economy in 1913 and 2002. We use these averages to construct two 
ratios for relative human capital endowment and relative GDP per capita which we plug into 
the extended Lucas-model.  
 The data for the contemporary period come from commonly used sources such as the 
World Development Indicator database (World Bank, 2005). Inflows of portfolio and equity 
capital over GDP are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2005). Data on 
educational attainment (average years of schooling) as a proxy for human capital endowments 
are taken from the updated Barro-Lee dataset (Barro and Lee, 2000). In total, we count 
observations for 54 countries for the contemporary period (1980-2002) covering a large 
number of developing and developed countries. Our analysis of the historical period builds on 
three recently compiled datasets for the first era of financial globalization (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2003; Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Ferguson and Schularick, 2006). From these 
datasets come all economic variables such as the human capital proxy (primary school 
enrollment). Real GDP data come from the seminal work of Angus Maddison (Maddison 
1995, 2001). Capital flow and foreign investment stock data are taken from the work of Stone 
(1999) as well as Feis (1965) and Woodruff (1966). A detailed data appendix is available 
from the authors on request. In total, we have assembled data for 24 countries over 1880-1914 
covering more than 80 percent of global GDP in 1914.2  
                                                 
2 Among the major economies, the only large country missing in the historical sample is China 
for which GDP series do not exist. The historical dataset comprises of European countries (Austria-





 Constructing average values for the rich and the poor half of the world results in a 
slightly higher relative human capital endowment in the historical period with poor-to-rich 
ratios of 0.45 back then versus 0.41 today. With regard to output differentials, we work with 
actual GDP per capita data for the modern period which show a rich-to-poor GDP per capita 
ratio of 0.25. However, this approach is problematic for the historical period as we know that 
substantial net capital movements between rich and poor haven taken place during the period. 
As these flows are likely to have lowered the initial gap in output per capita, we need to adjust 
output per capita for the effects of the capital transfers.  
Two additional assumptions are necessary. First, we follow Twomey (2000) and 
Schularick (2006, table 2) by assuming that the stock of physical capital in poor countries 
owned by foreign investors averaged 100 percent of GDP in developing countries in 1913. 
Second, we assume a capital-output ratio of three. On the basis of this information, we can 
calculate differences in GDP per capita between rich and poor countries under the 
counterfactual assumption that no capital had flown from rich to poor. 3 The calculation yields 
an original ex-ante output differential between poor and rich countries of 0.31. We also 
present our simulations below with the ex-post differences in GDP per capita of 0.36 to 
demonstrate the impact of these counterfactual assumptions.  
It is inherently difficult to quantify the difference in institutional quality between rich 
and poor economies. In this paper, we consequently abstain from making direct assumptions, 
but look to the model to tell us what differentials could explain the observed patterns of 
capital flows. Nonetheless, a few preliminary considerations are helpful. For the 
contemporary period, we can use data on property rights and legal protection such as the 
International Property Rights Index, the property rights index compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation and the quality of the legal system measured by the International Country Risk 
Guide. Despite different sources and compilation methods, all these indicators show that 
property rights protection in the average developing country is only about half as effective as 
in the OECD countries (IPRI, 2007; Heritage Foundation, 2006; Dollar, 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                        
American and Australasian settler economies (Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand) as well as 
South American (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay), Asian (Ceylon, India, Japan) and 
Middle Eastern (Egypt, Turkey/Ottoman Empire) economies.  
3 A similar procedure has been recently applied in a historical study focusing on the effect of capital 





For the historical period, there are no detailed country-by-country assessments of 
institutional quality that could serve as comparable signposts to approximate the differences 
in institutional quality. However, it is clear that on the eve of WW1, most of Asia and Africa 
was under colonial rule by the European powers. European rule could have had an impact on 
contract enforcement by foreign investors as Lucas himself noted in the quote above. Did 
colonial status improve property rights and legal protection for foreign investors?  
Ferguson and Schularick (2006) have shown that country risk implied by risk premia 
in the bond market was 60 percent lower for British colonies than for independent developing 
countries – after controlling for differences in economic development, debt levels and other 
solvency indicators. Moreover, this “Empire Effect” remained present in a sample that 
included rich core economies alongside poor colonies. In other words, after controlling for 
economic fundamentals and solvency indicators, in the eyes of British investors the residual 
institutional and political risks in poor colonies were actually lower than in more advanced 
economies such as the US, France or Germany.  
Looking with Lucas at the US and India in the year 1913 clarifies the picture. By 
1913, the US were the largest and on a per capita basis among the richest economies in the 
world. India, however, was among the poorest parts of the British Empire with a significant 
public debt burden and a real per capita income of 12 percent of the US. The country risk 
premium for US government bonds in the year 1913 was 52 basis points over British Consols. 
Without formal guarantees by the British government, India’s country risk premium as 
charged by the international bond market was two basis points lower than in the US – 50 basis 
points. The average of the less-developed parts of the British Empire (including many poor 
African colonies) was 46 basis points. It seems therefore likely that colonial status contributed 
significantly to equalizing institutional and legal investment risks between rich and poor 
economies. 
As for the other parts of the developing world that were not under formal colonial rule 
before WW1 such as Latin America and Eastern Europe, the recent literature argues that the 
European powers and the US policed and protected property rights by way of an informal 
imperialism (Kelly, 1998; Goetzmann and Ukhov, 2001). In particular Mitchener and 
Weidenmier (2005a,b) show that military pressure and political control were an important and 
commonly used enforcement mechanism for international debt transactions in 1870-1913. It 





sovereign risk and resulted in a higher relative degree of property rights protection in the 
periphery than today. 
  
4. Evaluating the extended Lucas model 
Using the parameters presented in table 1, we evaluate the model and plot the resulting rate of 
return differentials over the different ratios for institutional quality in graph 1. Looking at the 
modern period, lower GDP per capita in poor countries as implied by 
( / ) /( / ) 0.25m m m mp p r rY L Y L ≅ , together with diminishing returns to capital creates a positive rate 
of return differential. Yet, as Lucas argued before, weaker human capital endowment reduces 
the rate of return differential.4 However, the new insight from figure 1 is that in an extended 
Lucas framework, i.e. accounting for differences in property rights protection, a positive rate 
of return differential between rich and poor economies appears only if the differential in 
property rights protection is at or above 0.6. Assuming the level of property rights protection 
in the periphery is 60 percent of the level developed world, rates of return in the periphery 
would be a mere 11 percent higher than in the core. Given the margin of error of our 
approximations in table 1, the resulting differential is hardly enough to conclude that ex ante 
rate of return differentials in the contemporary world economy are large enough to incite large 
capital flows. If the rate of return in the typical rich country amounts to, say, 5 percent, the 
rate of return in the typical poor country would be 5.55 percent. In addition, the evidence on 
relative property rights protection discussed above even indicates that the differential could 
have been lower, maybe only around 0.55. In this case, the rate of return differential between 
rich and poor economies over the past 25 years would have been a rather insignificant 2 
percent. A figure low enough to explain the observed paucity of capital flows from rich to 
poor countries.  
                                                 
4 This result is qualitatively similar to Lucas (1990, p. 94). The reason is that we set / 0.41m mp rh h ≅  
whereas Lucas employs / 0.2m mp rh h ≅ . On the other hand, Lucas sets ( / ) / ( / ) 0.067m m m mp p r rY L Y L ≅ , whereas 





Table 1: Baseline set of parameters 
Technology 0.3α = ;  0.175γ =  
Relative human capitala / 0.41m mp rh h ≅ ;   / 0.45h hp rh h ≅  
Relative GDP per capitaa ( / ) /( / ) 0.25m m m mp p r rY L Y L ≅   (modern period; actual) 
( / ) / ( / ) 0.36h h h hp p r rY L Y L ≅   (historical period; actual) 
( / ) /( / ) 0.31h h h hp p r rY L Y L ≅   (historical period; counterfactual)b 
(a) The underlying data set is described in section 3. (b) The construction of the counterfactual relative GDP 
per capita is described in a technical appendix available from the authors.  
 
Evaluating (1) with data for the historical period, we ask the same question what 
assumptions we need to make for relative property rights protection to have sufficient 
incentives for capital movements given the discussed differentials in output and human capital 
endowment. The gap in (counterfactual) per capita incomes, ( / ) /( / ) 0.31h h h hp p r rY L Y L ≅ , is 
somewhat smaller than in the contemporary period which depresses the rate of return 
differential. Yet this effect is tamed by a higher relative human capital endowment of poor 
countries before WW1 than today, indicated by / 0.45h hp rh h ≅ . This being said, the rate of 
return differential could have been even larger if the impact of pre-WW1 migration on human 
capital levels (Hatton and Williamson, 2006, Table 1; Ferguson, 2003, pp. 11/12) was taken 
into account. In this case, there are reasons to assume that the human capital proxy 
underestimates the human capital endowment in poor countries before 1914.   
Figure 1 demonstrates that starting from a property rights differential in the vicinity of 
0.75 a substantial ex ante rate of return differential appears for the historical period. The rate 
of return differential grows to almost 50 percent as we move closer towards the assumption of 
equal institutional quality in rich and poor countries ( / 1p rμ μ = ) which could have been the 
case under colonial rule. Hence, even if transaction costs and risk aversion are taken into 
account, the ex ante rate of return differential before 1914 was large enough to explain the 
observed capital movements from rich to poor during that period. Interestingly, using actual 
instead of counterfactual data on per capita income yields a small rate of return differential of 
only around 1.04 (assuming 0.175γ = ) at high levels of relative institutional quality, i.e. 





era of globalization, this could be an indication that capital movements had eliminated 
substantial rate of return differentials by the end of the period. 
Summing up, with higher relative institutional quality in the periphery before 1914 
than today, an extended Lucas model suggests a substantial ex ante rate of return differential. 
While difficult to quantify precisely, the assumption of higher institutional standards carries a 
high plausibility in light of the evidence presented on the “Empire Effect” and informal 
arrangements that enhanced creditor protection. For instance, if we generalize the above 
example of equal country risk premia for the US and India before WW1, the resulting ex ante 
rate of return differential between rich and poor countries in the first era of globalization 
reaches more than 50 percent. Assuming a not unrealistic differential of 0.9 still yields a 
substantial rate of return differential of 35 percent – high enough to incite substantial capital 
transfers from rich to poor before WW1 and hence explain the different patterns of financial 
globalization then vs. now. 
 
 
Figure 1: Rate of return differentials in response to relative property rights. 
 
4. Summary 
The markedly different patterns of international capital mobility during the historical and the 
modern era can be explained within an extended Lucas (1990) framework that combines the 
“unproductive capital” and the “capital market failure” views. Two assumptions are critical: 
(1) the human capital externality in both periods is in the range [0.15,0.2]γ ∈ ; (2) the 
differential in institutional quality between rich and poor countries in the historical period was 
considerably higher than today, possibly around 0.9. While direct evidence on this last 
































assumption is limited, available data and narrative historical accounts make this seem 
plausible. In the light of the historical experience and the rate of return implications of an 
extended Lucas model, improvements in institutional quality are a key precondition for larger 
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